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Cake day: February 3rd, 2026
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Is naivete a sin?
No investigation no right to speak is a core part of MarxistLeninist thought as it has evolved. Naivete is not “a sin” but if you haven’t researched a topic you shouldn’t speak on it.
As Chairman Mao put it:
Unless you have investigated a problem, you will be deprived of the right to speak on it. Isn’t that too harsh? Not in the least. When you have not probed into a problem, into the present facts and its past history, and know nothing of its essentials, whatever you say about it will undoubtedly be nonsense. Talking nonsense solves no problems, as everyone knows, so why is it unjust to deprive you of the right to speak? Quite a few comrades always keep their eyes shut and talk nonsense, and for a Communist that is disgraceful. How can a Communist keep his eyes shut and talk nonsense?
It won’t do!
It won’t do!
You must investigate!
You must not talk nonsense!
I wouldn’t be surprised but I am neither amerikkkan nor have I looked into that.
No you don’t understand you can just become homeless and then let yourself die of preventable causes.
So not accepting exaggerated narratives means China is a utopia? Why do people rarely offer ordinary, policy-level criticism? There is plenty of it, but discussion often defaults to cartoonish claims instead of routine institutional analysis.
Where is the discussion of the hukou household registration system and its trade-offs?
Where is the discussion of local government reliance on land-use financing?
Where is the discussion of provincial policy experimentation and uneven implementation?
Where is the discussion of state-owned enterprises and their structural advantages and drawbacks?
Where is the discussion of demographic policy after the one-child era?
Where is the discussion of regional inequality between coastal and interior provinces?
Where is the discussion of the property sector’s role in household wealth and local budgets?
Where is the discussion of debt accumulation among provincial financing vehicles?
Where is the discussion of administrative campaign-style governance and its policy side effects?
Where is the discussion of bureaucratic incentives within the cadre evaluation system?
Where is the discussion of industrial policy prioritization and capital allocation?
Where is the discussion of urban planning constraints produced by internal migration controls?
Where is the discussion of education access differences tied to household registration?
Where is the discussion of long-term pension sustainability in an aging population?
I know where they are, in China because none of you know enough about China to have a proper discussion on any of these. All you know is spouting ridiculous talking points.
Go back to 4chan obergruppenfuhrer. Or provide some evidence/analysis but I doubt you have that capability.
First, let’s be precise about terms: capitalism is defined by private ownership of the means of production, profit-driven accumulation, and wage labor; socialism is defined by social ownership (state, collective, or cooperative), planning mechanisms, and the subordination of remaining market forces to developmental and social goals. They are distinct modes of production, not a binary where anything short of stateless communism “counts” as capitalism.
Second, “Western capitalism” isn’t a universal default, it specifically describes the Euro-Amerikan core and its integrated vassals (NATO, Five Eyes, dependent economies). That system is hegemonic, but it is not total. Russia, for instance, operates a distinct sovereign-capitalist model: not socialist, but explicitly de-linked from Western financial architecture and actively contesting unipolar dominance.
Third, China, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam are explicitly in the early stages of the socialist transitionary period. Their frameworks (especially China’s “primary stage of socialism”) theorize that underdeveloped socialist states must develop productive forces, utilize regulated markets, and engage globally while maintaining proletarian state power and public ownership of commanding heights. This isn’t “capitalism with red flags”; it’s a materialist strategy to build the basis for higher-stage socialism. Dismissing these distinctions because communism hasn’t been “achieved” yet misunderstands dialectics: transition is a process, not an event. You don’t call a bridge under construction meaningless because it has yet to reach the other side.
“liberal” denotes adherence to bourgeois democracy and capitalist property relations, (pro bourgeois democracy and private property)
The critique of certain “anarchists” is that they guise reactionary politics in radical language, which aids capitalism.
Most of the platforms you listed are “banned” largely a result of regulatory and data-governance issues. China requires internet services operating in the mainland market to comply with domestic regulations covering data protection, content management, and licensing, which generally includes managing Chinese user data within the Chinese regulatory framework and cooperating with local oversight. Many large foreign platforms chose not to operate under those requirements, so their services were never integrated into the mainland internet environment.
As for Reuters they aren’t banned per say they simply haven’t obtained the licences required to operate in the mainland (to my knowledge).
I meant that internet content in China is governed by formal laws and regulations, mainly enforced by the Cyberspace Administration of China (国家网信办) and related regulators. Chinese rules such as the 《网络信息内容生态治理规定》 classify online information and require platforms to prohibit illegal content and prevent harmful content, including material that endangers national security, spreads rumors that disrupt social order, promotes extremism or violence, or infringes on others’ rights. Platforms are legally required to monitor and remove such content and regulators can order services restricted or removed if they violate these rules.
On the property point, it’s the same principle as the other restrictions. When someone refuses to comply with a court judgment and is placed under high-consumption restrictions (限制高消费), the court can restrict certain forms of luxury spending, which can include purchasing additional real estate or carrying out non-essential renovations until the debt or judgment is fulfilled. The idea is that if someone owes money according to a court ruling, they should not be spending large amounts on luxury consumption before complying. Existing property is not automatically taken just because someone is on the list, although assets can be enforced as part of normal debt collection(just as in every other country).
As for Xu Xiaodong’s accounts being wiped, that situation was tied to the series of lawsuits and disputes he became involved in, along with platform moderation rules. That falls under content moderation and legal disputes on private platforms, not the court enforcement mechanism we were discussing earlier.
The blocked-website lists you see online are a very mixed bag. Some sites are inaccessible because of political or regulatory issues, but many cases come down to compliance requirements, such as rules around data protection, licensing, and the requirement for companies handling Chinese user data to host or manage that data within China’s regulatory framework. When companies choose not to comply with those requirements, their services often simply do not operate in the mainland market.
And that meme about texting someone “Tiananmen 1989” to get them arrested is honestly pretty ugly. It basically jokes about condemning random Chinese people to some vague punishment for the sake of a punchline, which is a pretty dehumanizing way to talk about an entire population. Fortunately it’s also just a meme, sending a phrase like that to someone does not magically cut their internet or get them arrested.
Unfortunately I don’t think ranked choice voting will save you. You need to clear the board so to speak and get some options that actually represent people over corporate interests.
The Xu Xiaodong case actually illustrates the exact point I was making. He wasn’t punished for “criticizing kung fu masters” or for having the wrong opinions. What happened is that he lost a defamation lawsuit and the court ordered him to apologize and pay damages. He refused to comply with the ruling, and because of that he was placed on the judgment-defaulter list (失信被执行人). Chinese reporting describes the reason as “有履行能力而拒不履行生效法律文书确定义务”, having the ability to comply with a court judgment but refusing to do so. Once someone is on that list, courts can impose high-consumption restrictions (限制高消费), which include things like flights, certain high-speed rail tickets, and luxury hotels until the judgment is fulfilled. In other words, the trigger was refusing to carry out a court order, not some general punishment for speech.
On the data issue, you’re citing reports from Western government-linked think tanks and security NGOs, which obviously approach the topic from a national security perspective. China’s cybersecurity and data laws (like the Cybersecurity Law and Data Security Law) exist because the state wants control over critical data flows, infrastructure security, and cross-border data transfer. That approach isn’t unique in principle; governments everywhere are tightening control over data because it has become a strategic resource. But those laws are regulatory frameworks about data governance, not mechanisms that automatically “ruin someone’s social credit.” The think-tank papers you cited are describing geopolitical risk concerns, not explaining how the Chinese court enforcement system actually works.
On the app point, what the BBC article referred to were tools connected to the court defaulter database, sometimes nicknamed things like a “laolai map.” That’s basically a searchable database of people who have lost a case and then refused to comply with the judgment, which courts use to pressure them to comply. Many countries have debtor registries or public enforcement records; the difference here is mostly presentation. Western coverage often framed it as part of a sinister “social credit” ecosystem when in reality it was tied to a specific court enforcement list, not a universal citizen score. It’s good to have a database of those who have defrauded people. And to be honest, the BBC has a long history of framing Chinese policy in a particular narrative, so it’s not surprising that nuance tends to disappear.
The reality is that some of these mechanisms absolutely exist, but how they work, who they apply to, and what they actually do is often somewhere between heavy exaggeration and outright fantasy in viral discussions. What exists in practice is a mixture of court enforcement lists, regulatory blacklists, and sector-specific compliance systems. Turning that into a story about every citizen having a constantly changing “social credit score” controlling their life is a much simpler narrative, but it’s not how the underlying policies are actually structured.
Because cowbee (who you responded to) was talking about how the genocide narrative is bullshit? Are you illiterate?
Abuses and genocide are 2 very different things. If you want to talk about the abuses during the ETIM crackdown and what was done wrong etc that’s definitely possible but you should really stop spreading the genocide narrative that smears mud on this real serious conversation.
The social credit system that you know of doesn’t exist.
Do you have any proof? The OISC disagree with you. And even the UN doesn’t call it a genocide because that’s not what happened.
This comparison mixes a few real policies with a lot of exaggeration. For example, the train and flight issue people always bring up is not about having a vague “bad social credit score.” What actually exists is a court enforcement measure. If someone refuses to comply with an effective court judgment (most commonly paying a debt or damages) the court can place them on the judgment-defaulter list (失信被执行人) and issue a high-consumption restriction (限制高消费). That mainly blocks luxury consumption like flights, first-class rail seats, and luxury hotels until the court order is fulfilled. The purpose is simply to pressure people to comply with the judgment and protect the creditor’s rights (why should sleazy business people who don’t pay their debts get to live lavishly).
Because of that, the claim that “if you have bad social credit you’re basically locked out of everything” is misleading. These restrictions target specific high-end consumption, not normal daily life. Even Chinese legal explanations make clear that they are meant to restrict non-essential spending such as flying, luxury hotels, expensive travel, etc., rather than basic living or ordinary transportation.
The surveillance point is also mixing separate issues. China does have strong state monitoring powers and extensive digital infrastructure, but that is not what the court enforcement blacklist system is. The travel restrictions and blacklists people talk about come from civil enforcement procedures in the courts, not from scanning someone’s phone or some universal personal “score.”
The same confusion shows up in the company data point. China has strict data and cybersecurity laws, but those are regulatory and national security frameworks. They are not the mechanism that puts someone on the judgment-defaulter list. That list exists specifically because someone ignored a legally binding court ruling, not because they refused to hand over corporate data.
And the idea that there is some nationwide app warning citizens about people with low “social credit” is another exaggeration. What actually exists are court databases of judgment defaulters, sometimes publicly searchable, similar to debtor registries in many legal systems. Again, the target is people who lost a case and then refused to comply with the ruling.
So the reality is much more mundane than the viral version. China absolutely has strong enforcement tools, but the famous travel bans people cite are mainly a judicial enforcement mechanism against people who refuse to comply with court judgments, not a universal social-credit score controlling everyone’s daily life.
Every time I make any criticism of China, the responses are apologetic at best.
Probably because 90% of your “criticism” is just spreading lies.
Lmao. Clearly not looking very hard. The CPC even by western sources has an approval rate somewhere between 85 and 98%.